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THE INTENT REQUIREMENT OF THE MBTA AFTER




[L]et the boll weevil go to rest amidst the happy
hunting grounds of his fathers in that great and
splendid region of our land where he first saw the
light. Let his onward march of destruction be halted
forever, and few there will be, even where the
doctrine of State rights is... cherished. Who will
lament his departure or criticize those who have
hastened his funeral obsequies, as is intended by this
act, and may his allies of the same vicious type...
share his fate. Let the song bird live to herald to the
world its happy and joyous anthem proclaiming the
goodness of God to all his creatures. Senator
Stedman's eloquent comment on the enactment of
the MBTA and the increase in population of
migratory birds, which in turn feed on unsuspecting
grubs and lugworms that apparently will not be
missed.'
From the nomadic tribesmen of long past to the suburban
couch potato of today, one insatiable human instinct is to hunt.2
Famed English Novelist Charles Dickens best articulated our desire
to hunt in stating, "there is a passion for hunting something deeply
implanted in the human breast."3 This quest to conquer and often
ruefully slaughter countless animals caused great concern at the turn
of the nineteenth century.4 Specifically, in response to the foreseen
"B.A., Georgetown College 1998; J.D. , University of Kentucky 2001. The author
wishes to thank Beth Constant for her assistance in developing this Comment and his parents
for their continued support.
'56 Cong. Rec. 7362 (daily ed. June 4, 1918) (statement of Sen. Stedman).
2See generally William E. Sulzer, Note and Comment, United States v. Boynton: A
Bona Fide Reason for Applying a Subjective Standard to the Exceptions of the Anti-Baiting
Regulation, 14 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 767, 770 (1997).3
CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 84 (1838). However, others find this innate
desire to hunt reprehensible. See, e.g., Katherine Hessler, Where Do We Draw the Line Between
Harassment and Free Speech?: An Analysis of Hunter Harassment Law, 3 ANIMAL L. 129, 153
(1997) (equating hunting to slavery in support of the proposition that status as "an important
part of American Heritage" does not necessarily lead to continuing importance or protection).
4See Sulzer, supra note 2, at 770-71. The dawn of the nineteenth century brought,
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demise of birds hunted for sport,5 Congress enacted the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) in 1918 to combat the potential extinction
of birds throughout the nation.6
However, the passage of time has now turned the hunters into
the hunted.7 The MBTA's repeated attempts to restrict the activities
of law-abiding hunters caused gamesmen to be charged with federal
89crimes. This expanded enforcement of the MBTA9 is arguably
beyond the intent of the Act expressed in 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994)Io
This Comment analyzes the intent requirement of the anti-
baiting regulation" enforced pursuant to the MBTA in four parts.
Part I provides the factual and procedural information on United
States v. Adams,12 which is the Fifth Circuit's most recent attempt to
explain the intent requirement of the MBTA. Part 11 explores the
history of the MBTA's intent requirement and the conflicting views
"massive agricultural and industrial development [to] the United States render[ing] hunting an
activity no longer essential to survival .... Darren K. Cottriel, Comment, The Right to Hunt in
the Twenty-First Century: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save an American Tradition?, 27
PAC. L. J. 1235, 1245 (1996).
'The rate of extinction of animals has grown exponentially over the past century.
From the 1600s to the 1900s, it is estimated that only one mammal or bird species became
extinct every four years. See Ray Vaughan, State of Extinction: The Case of the Alabama
Sturgeon and Ways Opponents of the Endangered Species Act Thwart Protection for Rare
Species, 46 ALA. L. REV. 569, 640 (1995) (citing LES KAUFMAN, WHY THE ARK IS SINKING, IN
THE LAST ExTINcTION 1,1 (Les Kaufman & Kenneth Mallory eds., 1986)). However, "[h]alf of
all the species known to have become extinct during recorded human history became extinct in
the twentieth century." Id. (citing T.H. WATKINS & Liz BOUSSARD, LIFE LIST, U.S.A.,
WILDERNESS OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (SUMMER 199 1)).
6See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994); see also Benjamin Means, Note, Prohibiting Conduct,
Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV.
823,831 (1998).7Both hunters and farmers are under the continual watch of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Agents at the State and Federal levels. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 704. The
government's desire to protect migratory birds, some argue, now outweighs the legal activities
of farmers that sow their fields at odd times of the year and hunters that innocently hunt in a
baited field. See generally United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Dize, 839 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Md. 1993); United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742 (D.
Idaho 1989).
8Since the enactment of the MBTA eighty-two years ago, countless numbers of
hunters and farmers have been subjected to scrutiny under this statute due to its expansive effect
on several activities. Any activities directed at migratory birds, be it hunting, farming, or
recreational, have been prosecuted under the MBTA. See Means, supra note 6, at 832.
9The MBTA applies to the following five ornithological families: Anatidae (ducks,
geese, and swans); Columbidae (doves and pigeons); Gruidae (cranes); Rallidae (rails, coots
and gallinules ); and Scolopacidae (woodcock and snipe). See 50 C.F.R. § 20.11 (2000). The
expansive nature of this act is apparently based on the complete list of protected birds which
number well over fifteen hundred. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2000).
'()The unlawful taking, killing, or possessing of migratory birds, as discussed in 16
U.S.C. § 703, is expressly governed by the rules provided in Title 50 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
"Migratory Bird Hunting, 50 C.F.R. § 20.2 (i)(I)-(2) (2000).
1
2United States v. Adams, 174 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 1999).
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of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Brandt13 and the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Boynton.' 4 Part H further discusses the
recent amendment to 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 and the effect this change
will have on the intent requirement in the MBTA.
Part Im analyzes Adams' compromise of the subjective and
objective standards to determine the intent required under the MBTA,
and the significance the recent amendment will have on this standard
in the future. Part IV concludes the Comment by exposing the
current uncertain state of the law regarding the intent requirement
under the MBTA due to Adams and the arguably conflicting
amendment of 50 C.F.R. § 20.21.
I. UNITED STATES V. ADAMS: SETTING THE STAGE
A. Facts
Jerry Arville Adams (Adams) planted his annual winter
wheat crop in August of 1997.'5 During the planting of this crop, a
total of thirty-three bags of seed were spread until the defendant's
spreader broke, at which time Adams scattered two remaining bags
by hand.16 On September 6, 1997, Adams and three relatives went
dove hunting on the planted field and the defendant shot his limit of
twelve doves. 17 At that time, Federal and Louisiana State Wildlife
Agents approached the defendant and inspected both the wheat field
and doves.' 8 During the inspection of Adams' game, one of the
injured doves escaped from his hunting bag and flew away. 9
B3United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1983).
14United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1995).
15Adams, 174 F.3d at 573. The court noted that, "Adams prepared a field of
approximately 18-19 acres ... for the planting of winter wheat to graze his cattle on during the
upcoming winter." Id.
1tThe court, citing from the record, noted that the defendant scattered the wheat "as
uniformly as possible." Id. Even though the baited wheat field belonged to the defendant, it
was not necessary to show he participated in the baiting. See United States v. Chandler, 753
F.2d 360,361-62 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, explicit consent from a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Agent
that a farmer or hunter is acting within the purview of the MBTA does not protect the actor
from liability for baiting migratory birds. See United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431,436 (8th
Cir. 1986).
17Adams, 174 F.3d at 574.
181d.
19According to the defendant, he shot the bird and, assuming it was dead, placed it in
his game bag. Id. It is interesting to note that Adams could be charged for either taking the
injured bird or leaving the bird because, "[n]o person shall kill or cripple any migratory game
bird ...without making a reasonable effort to retrieve the bird, and retain it in his actual
custody ... ." 50 C.F.R. § 20.25 (2000). See also United States v. Edwards, 976 F. Supp. 807
(E.D. Ark. 1997) (upholding the conviction of five hunters for wanton waste of game based on
50 C.F.R. § 20.25); United States v. King, Crim. A. No. 88-511, 1992 WL 73358 (E.D. La.
1992) (upholding nine charges of failing to retrieve injured or killed migratory birds). Thus,
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Adams was subsequently charged on two federal violations
pursuant to the MBTA: (1) the anti-baiting provision and (2)
possession of the live dove.20 Title 50 C.F.R. § 20.21, discussing
illegal hunting methods, states that, "no person shall take migratory
game birds2' ... (i) by the aide of baiting, or on or over any baited
area, where a person knows or reasonably should know that the area
is or has been baited., 22 Thus, Adams was initially fined a total of
$1,780, "and placed on [a] one year supervised probation with the
condition that he cannot hunt,23 go to hunting camps, or carry a
firearm, along with the standard conditions of probation. 24
B. Procedural History
Adams was convicted in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana "for taking doves with the aid of
bait and aiding and abetting others in taking doves with the aid of
bait, 2 5 along with possession of a live dove. 6 On appeal to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the defendant only challenged the charge of
illegally baiting doves by the spreading of seeds for his wheat crop.27
The Fifth Circuit analyzed both the subjective intent under United
States v. Brand?' and the objective approach under United States v.
Boynton,29  and reversed the defendant's conviction using a
combination of both cases.30  Before delving into the heart of the
analysis in Adams, it is helpful to review the historical significance of
the MBTA and Congress' ability to enact federal regulations limiting
hunting methods of migratory birds.3 '
Adams is placed in a most precarious position because he is liable for both leaving an injured
bird and for illegally capturing a migratory bird due to the conflicting goals in 50 C.F.R. §§
20.21 and 20.25.20See Adams, 174 F.3d at 574; 50 C.F.R. §§ 20.21, 20.38 (2000).
211t is important to note that the MBTA applies only to wild birds and not captive
reared animals. See United States v. Conners, 606 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1979); see also 16
U.S.C. § 703.2250 C.F.R. § 20.21.
23The rather pervasive act of hunting includes, "to follow or search for (game or
prey) for the purpose and with the means of capturing or killing.., for food or in sport ....
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1103 (unabridged 1986).
24Adams, 174 F.3d at 574.
251d. at 573.
261d. at 574.
2"He was also convicted on one count of possessing a live dove in violation of 50
C.F.R. § 20.38, but does not challenge it on appeal." Id. at 573.28United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1983).
29United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1995).
"See generally Adams, 174 F.3d at 575-76.
31While the scope of this Comment focuses on the potential liability of hunters and
farmers under the MBTA, there is a growing trend to expand these regulations to corporate
actors. In United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass "n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999), the
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II. HISTORY OF THE MBTA's ANTI-BAITING INTENT REQUIREMENT
A. The History of the MBTA and Congressional Authority to Limit
Hunting Methods of Migratory Birds
Society's fast and loose attitude about environmental
preservation around the turn of the century led to the drastic depletion
of migratory birds and other wildlife across the nation.32 Congress
fought to regulate these environmental problems33 and eventually
persuaded President Woodrow Wilson to use his treaty power to
enact the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918.34 The MBTA, in part,
states:
[u]nless and except as permitted by regulations made
as hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be
unlawful at any time, by any means or in any
manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to
take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, [or] sell
... any migratory bird ....
The Act, in essence, is an exclusionary measure which
prevents hunters and farmers from taking any action against a
migratory bird unless specifically allowed by the United States
Secretary of the Interior. 6 The Secretary can "establish regulations
defining precisely when and where migratory birds can be hunted. 37
The enforcement of these regulations is controlled by the official
agent of the Secretary of the Interior, the United States Fish and
court convicted an electric company on both the MBTA and the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act (BGEPA) for the unintentional electrocution of twelve Golden Eagles, four
Ferruginous Hawks, and one Great Homed Owl. See id. at 1071.32See Vaughan, supra note 5, at 640.33Congress' authority to enforce the Migratory Bird Act of 1913 was held invalid
due to the constitutional challenge in United States v. Shauver, 214 F.l154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
See Sulzer, supra note 2, at 771. Before the issue was taken up on appeal by the Supreme
Court, the President decided to use his treaty power with Great Britain, "to accomplish the same
objective as the 1913 Act." Id. at 773.34Sulzer, supra note 2, at 773. In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920),
Justice Holmes upheld the MBTA in stating, "[iut is obvious that there may be matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but
that a treaty followed by such an act could ... 
3116 U.S.C. § 703.36In creating the MBTA, Congress promulgated the power to enforce the statute to
the Secretary of the Interior. See Sulzer, supra note 2, at 777-78. In addressing how migratory
birds may be taken, 16 U.S.C. § 704 states that, "the Secretary of the Interior is authorized and
directed ... to adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing [how migratory birds are
hunted]."
37Sulzer, supra note 2, at 777.
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Wildlife Department.3 Specifically, the Federal and Louisiana State
Wildlife Agents who arrested Adams were enforcing the anti-baiting
regulations enacted under 50 C.F.R. § 20.2 1.39 However, courts such
as the Fourth Circuit in Boynton and the Sixth Circuit in Brandt are
inconsistent in determining the requisite intent of the defendant for a
conviction under the MBTA.
B. Determining the Intent of the Accused in United States v. Brandt
and United States v. Boynton
The regulations under 50 C.F.R. § 20.214' are tempered by
the following two exceptions:
[n]othing in this [anti-baiting provision] prohibits:
(1) the taking of any migratory game bird... [on]
lands or areas... (i) where seeds or grains have been
scattered solely as the result of a normal agricultural
planting ... (2) [t]he taking of any migratory game
bird . . . where grain or other feed has been
distributed or scattered solely as the result of
manipulation of an agricultural crop or other feed on
the land where grown ....42
The debate over Congress' intent in this statute is "whether
the tests for compliance should be objective, with no regard to the
defendant's level of intent or knowledge, or subjective, with the
intent of the person that spread the grain determining whether a
violation had occurred. '43  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
38See id.; see also 50 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2000).39Section 20.21 entitled "What hunting methods are illegal?" is at the core of the
controversy in the enforcement of the MBTA due to its amorphous discussion of the intent
requirement in the hunting and baiting of migratory birds. In addition, the regulation is in
constant flux. In the past year, Congress has employed a hit-and-miss tactic by amending the
regulation on five separate occasions. See 64 Fed. Reg. 7507, 7515 (Feb. 16, 1999); 64 Fed.
Reg. 29,799, 29,804 (June 3, 1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 32,778, 32,780 (June 17, 1999); 64 Fed. Reg.
45,400, 45, 405 (Aug. 19, 1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 71,236, 71,237 (Dec. 20, 1999).
40See generally United States v. Adams, 174 F.3d 571, 575 (5th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955, 957 (6th
Cir. 1983).
4The regulation states in part that "no person shall take migratory game birds ... (a)
[w]ith a trap, snare, net, rifle, pistol[,] ... machine gun, fish hook, poison, drug, explosive[,] ...
(b) a shotgun . . .capable of holding more than three shells[,] . . . (d) motor vehicle[,] ...
motorboat[,] . .. (0 live birds as decoys[,] . . . (g) [or] electrically amplified bird calls." 50
C.F.R. § 20.21.
4250 C.F.R. § 20.2 (i)(l)-(2).
43 Adams, 174 F.3d at 575. The court notes that both Brandt and Boynton, "decided
[to] adhere to a strict liability view of the MBTA." Id.
[VOL. 15:2
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United States v. Brandt applied a subjective intent standard in
convicting a defendant for hunting doves.44 The court held that the
inquiry should be a subjective interpretation "directed to determining
the intent of the person seeding the land." 45 However, the MBTA has
consistently been interpreted to be a strict liability statute, meaning
that the intent of the accused is irrelevant for conviction of a crime.
46
The Court of Appeals in Adams notes, "the Brandt Court
maintains that it has not changed the Sixth Circuit's strict liability
view of the Act.' 47  Brandt uses the subjective requirement by
drawing a distinction between the hunter and the farmer.48 Thus, the
hunter's subjective intent is theoretically irrelevant 49 because "the
relevant inquiry would be whether the farmer's desire to attract birds
caused him to initiate measures he would not otherwise have taken..
S.91'0 This use of the subjective intent was questioned and thoroughly
rejected in United States v. Boynton."'
As in Adams, Boynton involved a hunter being convicted
under 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 (i)(2) for the taking of migratory birds in a
baited area.5 2  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boynton
declared, "a review of the history and structure of the MBTA
immediately reveals that a subjective interpretation of the regulation
is plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulatory scheme [of
"Brandt, 717 F.2d at 957 (6th Cir. 1983); see also Sulzer, supra note 2, at 768-69.
4 5Brandt, 717 F.2d at 957.
"[lI]t was not the intention of Congress to require any guilty knowledge or intent to
complete the commission of the offense [in violating the MBTA]." United States v. Schultze,
28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Ky. 1939). See also Means, supra note 6, at 823; United States v.
Rollins 706 F. Supp. 742, 744 (D. Idaho 1989)(providing an example of strict liability under the
MBTA in stating that, "a homeowner could be pursued under the MBTA if a flock of geese
crashed into his plate-glass window and were killed."). But see United States v. Wulff, 758
F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the MBTA violated due process for a felony conviction
of selling migratory bird parts because the crime was not known at common law and penalty
would result in irreparable harm to one's reputation).47Adams, 174 F.3d at 575.
4 The court in Brandt construed the MBTA to use the objective intent requirement
only on the farmer because the farmer is the one who actually spreads the seed. Conversely, the
court notes that a hunter, if under the objective requirement, would need to discover the intent
of the farmer before he hunted, or else he would also be subject to liability. The court found
this to be unduly hard on the hunter and adopted the more lenient subjective standard under
which to judge the actions of the hunter. Brandt, 717 F.2d at 958.
"This analysis applies only if we assume that the hunter and farmer in this context
are not the same person.
"°Adams, 174 F.3d at 575.
"See United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 1995).
52Boynton involved the conviction of three hunters who illegally hunted on a ninety
yard tract around a dried-up pond which was spread with grain approximately one month
earlier. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction ofthe defendants, finding
that the objective intent requirement under the MBTA better complemented the strict liability
nature of the statute than a subjective intent. See id.; see also Sulzer, supra note 2, at 785-88.
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the Act]. 53  Specifically, the court noted, "such an interpretation
would lead to the absurd result of requiring the prosecution to prove
an intent element, when Congress intended that misdemeanor
violations of the MBTA be regulatory, strict liability crimes. 54
Thus, at first blush, the objective interpretation of the anti-
baiting exceptions championed in Boynton appears to be a more
straightforward construction of the statute.55 However, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Department's most recent revisions, along with the Fifth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Adams, effectively clouds the
intent requirement debate.56
C. The Recent Amendment to 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 and Congress'
Response to the Intent Debate in the MBTA
On June 3, 1999, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Department, on
behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, issued a final rule revising the
anti-baiting exceptions under 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 (i).57 Specifically, the
agency stated, "[p]aragraph 20.21(i)(2) of this rule changes the
current regulation that allowed the hunting of migratory game birds,
except waterfowls, over a bona fide agricultural operation and
replaces it with the term normal agricultural operation. '
58
This change has come primarily in response to the various
53Boynton, 63 F.3d at 343.
5id. Boynton refused to extend the logic of the Sixth Circuit in Brandt in drawing a
distinction between the intent requirement of the hunter and the farmer. Id. The court
continued, "[slince the inception of the Migratory Bird Treaty in the early part of this century,
misdemeanor violations of the MBTA ... have been interpreted by the majority of courts as
strict liability crimes." Id. (citing United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986)).
'5 This is apparent by a mere examination of the definitions of the terms objective,
subjective, and strict liability. First, the term objective is defined as being "based on externally
verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an individual's perceptions, feelings, or intentions."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1101 (7th ed. 1999). However, a subjective intent is "based on an
individual's perceptions, feelings, or intention" which clearly proves the two terms are opposite
of each other. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1438 (7th ed. 1999). The clear connection between
an objective intent and strict liability comes from the definition of strict liability as, "liability
that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
926 (7th ed. 1999).
56See generally United States v. Adams, 174 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 1999); 50 C.F.R. §
20.21. 5
1See 64 Fed. Reg. 29,799 (1999).
51ld. at 29,803 (emphasis supplied). The significance of this change in terminology
is apparent in United States v. Adams. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit stated that based on the
language "bona fide agricultural operations or procedures under § 20.21(i)(2), the better
reasoned view is that the subjective intent of the person planting the field should be considered
in light of the objective agricultural norms used in the area." Adams, 174 F.3d at 576. Based on
this quote, it is apparent that the Fifth Circuit would only enforce the subjective requirement
due to the language in § 20.21(i)(2) before the recent amendment. Since the language is now
couched in terms of an objective standard, it appears that Adams would now agree with United
States v. Boynton in using the objective intent standard.
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ways courts have interpreted the exception to the anti-baiting
clause.59 For example, in Boynton, the court states that, "the second
exception for 'bona fide agricultural operations . ..' suggests that a
subjective element is introduced into the regulatory scheme."
60
Further, the term bonafide means "good faith,' which suggests that
the intent of the person planting the seeds is based upon a subjective
standard and that the government is obligated to prove this intent
before a conviction can be obtained.62
The amendment of § 20.21(i)(2) does suggest that the
Secretary, via the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Department, is attempting to
clarify the debate over whether to use an objective or subjective
intent under the statute.63 Further, the Fish and Wildlife Department
specifically affirmed Adams' act by stating, "after careful
consideration, we will not prohibit the hunting of migatory game
birds over lands planted by means of top sowing .... However,
the amended section fails to clearly state that the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Department adopts the objective intent standard.65  Thus,
courts should apply United States v. Adams until the Secretary
provides explicit language otherwise or another case analyzes the
new language in § 20.21.
III. UNITED STATES V. ADAMS: THE GREAT COMPROMISE
A. Adams Decision to Combine Both Subjective and Objective
Intent Requirements
United States v. Adams was decided on May 3, 1999, which
is prior to the important June 3, 1999, amendment of 50 C.F.R. §
59See United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding conviction
of defendant for baiting migratory birds even though U.S. Fish and Wildlife Agents arguably
provided misleading information so as to cloud the true intent of the defendant); United States
v. Traxler, 847 F. Supp. 492 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (upholding MBTA conviction of two defendants
even though twelve guests hunting at the same time were not charged).
6"United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis supplied).61BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 168 (7th ed. 1999). "The Latin Words 'bona fide'
included in the hunting regulations mean in good faith or without fraud." Boynton, 63 F.3d at
342. Even though the court in Boynton was able to reconcile the clear meaning of the term
bona fide and determine that the intent requirement was objective, it is clear that this
terminology hints at a subjective requirement for the accused. See supra note 55.
62See generally United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1983).
63See United States v. Adams, 174 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 1999).
"See 64 Fed. Reg. 29,799, 29,803 (1999).
651n promulgating the final rule of 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 on June 3, 1999, the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Department could have simply stated that they were enacting an objective intent
requirement rather than changing the language of the statute. Without a clear articulation of the
regulation, it is apparent that the debate will linger on until taken up by the courts.
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20.21 (i)(2).66 To date, Adams is the most current articulation of the
MBTA's intent requirement; 67 until another court construes the
amended regulation, the exact scope of the statute will be unknown.
Still, Adams provides a workable structure to help understand this
68unfolding saga.
Adams begins by stating that when construing § 20.21(i)(1),
"an objective test should be used to determine if an activit,
constitutes a 'normal agricultural planting or harvesting' . . . .
Thus, Adams' 7planting will be viewed from a reasonable person's
point of view. However, the court extends this objective test by
allowing "a defendant... to introduce evidence he may have tending
to show that the field was prepared in a locally accepted manner.,
71
The court allowed this in response to the government's use of
a Louisiana State University Agricultural Pamphlet which opined as
to when winter wheat crops should be planted. Since Adams
asserted that he planted at a different time of year than the pamphlet's
suggestion, as did his father, the Fifth Circuit allowed local and
community practices to be considered as evidence when determining
if baiting occurred under the MBTA.n
6664 Fed. Reg. at 29,804.
67This intent requirement discussed is limited to hunters and farmers and not to
corporate actors. See supra note 31.
6"As of 1990, it was estimated that around 200 million birds and animals are hunted
and killed each year. See Cottriel, supra note 4, at n.295 (citing Michael Satchell, The
American Hunter Under Fire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 5, 1990, at 30). Regardless
of personal stances for or against hunting, it is obvious that there will be ample opportunity to
revisit the debate over the MBTA intent requirement in the future.
"Adams, 174 F.3d at 576. See also United States v. Brandt, 717 F.2d 955, 958 (6th
Cir. 1983)(where the court states that a normal agricultural planting or harvesting, "has as its
primary goal the growth and harvesting of a crop-not the enticement of migratory birds.").
7 The court stated that, "an activity will be deemed 'normal' if it could be thought
consistent with the commonly accepted methods used in the area to produce a crop." Adams,
174 F.3d at 576. Thus, the standard espoused here stems from an activity based upon the
actions of a reasonable person within a community context.
71The court in Adams used aspects from both an objective and subjective intent
requirement with respect to the introduction of evidence for the agricultural planting behaviors
of local farmers. The court reasoned that under a strict objective analysis, Adams would not be
allowed to introduce personal evidence of the time of year he planted his wheat field. However,
the only evidence admitted at trial was a Louisiana State University Agricultural Pamphlet
which gave suggested dates of planting, and based on this evidence, it was determined that
Adams planted outside of the normal time frame. The court concluded that in interest to the
established practices of local farmers, such as Adams, they would allow an opportunity to
present subjective proof on why he planted his crops outside of the suggested time frame. Id.
(emphasis supplied).
72d. See supra note 71.
3The court's rationale in Adams is similar to the Sixth Circuit's use of the subjective
requirement in Brandt. Both courts are concerned with the conviction of an innocent actor
whose subjective intent was not the illegal baiting or hunting of migratory birds. In Brandt the
court was concerned with an innocent hunter, whereas the court is concerned with an innocent
farmer in Adams. The use of a subjective standard in these situations is compelling, but the
recent amendment of 50 C.F.R. § 20.2 I(i)(2) suggests that these innocent actors, both hunters
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In response to the "bona fide agricultural operations, ' 74 the
court in Adams held that the person's subjective intent should apply
rather than the objective standard used in Boynton.75 As noted, the
specific language "bona fide agricultural operations or procedures"
76
was explicitly removed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Agency. Thus,
there is no need to dwell on the court's handling of this language.
However, it remains unclear whether 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i)(2) now
infers that the subective requirement in the anti-baiting exceptions
has been removed.
B. Adams Impact on the Intent Requirement Following the
Amendment of 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 (i)(2)
The debate over the subjective versus objective intent
requirement under the anti-baiting exception of 50 C.F.R. §
20.21(i)(2) is far from over. 8 If Adams is an indication of the courts'
interpretation of the regulation, it appears that the objective intent is
the clear victor in the debate, given the removal of the bona fide
agricultural operation language from the regulation.79
However, as noted in Part Irn-A, in Adams, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals finds it critical to take into account several local,
subjective activities to determine if the accused falls within the
"normal agricultural procedure" 80 required by the regulation. Thus,
any determination based on evidence used to set an objective
standard will allow a defendant the opportunity to present evidence
showing that the spreading of seeds or the defendant's hunting
and farmers, are subject to liability due to the strict liability feature assumed under Boynton.
74Since the court's decision in Adams is prior to the recent amendment to 50 C.F.R.
§ 20.2 1(i)(2), we can see how the court analyzed the prior language of the regulation. Even
though this is no longer good law, the analysis provides a framework that can be used to
understand the future effect and new language of the statute. Adams, 174 F.3d at 576.
7SAdams, 174 F.3d at 576.
76See 64 Fed. Reg. 29,799, 29,804 (1999).
77See supra note 55.
78See generally United States v. Adams, 174 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 1999); 50 C.F.R.
20.2 1(i)(2); 64 Fed. Reg. at 29,803.
79The court in Adams relied heavily on the objective standard used by Boynton. The
Fifth Circuit's decision varied from Boynton only on the language which was subsequently
removed from the regulation by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Department. Thus, it is apparent
that the objective standard will apply to violations under the MBTA. However, there is concern
over the loss of ability of a farmer or hunter to effectively present evidence on why he acted the
way he did. Specifically, it can be argued that farmers or hunters who can prove that their
actions were within the local community practices should be judged on this regional subjective
standard under Adams.
The Sixth Circuit discussed factors such as planting dates, seed distribution, and
commonly accepted methods in the area to determine if the particular spreading of seed was
within a reasonable standard. Adams, 174 F.3d at 576. Thus, it is apparent that some remnants
of the subjective element is preserved in this articulation of the standard.
2000-2001]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
methods8' fall within the accepted normal practices of the
82community.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court's decision to use an objective standard in Adams
stems from support given by United States v. Boynton. This factor,
coupled with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Department's decision to
amend the statute, lends strong support for the conclusion that the
requisite intent under the MBTA is based on an objective standard. 84
To solidify this stance, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Department must
enact a clear anti-baiting exception under 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i)(2), or
the judicial system must construe the regulation and end this debate
so the public at large will know what is required of farmers and
hunters in the future.
It appears that the slight variation between Adams and
Boynton86 makes a substantial difference when determining which
standard to apply, and this Comment concludes by suggesting that the
hybrid approach in Adams should be the standard used to enforce 50
C.F.R. § 20.21(i)(2). Where Boynton applies an objective standard
for every situation, Adams would allow the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to establish the intent of the accused. With this limitation
"The Adams Court did not address whether or not commonly accepted hunting
practices should be admissible extrinsic evidence. Rather, their focus was on the farming
methods of the accused. However, since the applicability of the regulations is primarily
focused on both hunters and farmers, it is likely that hunters would be afforded the same
protections under Adams.82This conclusion assumes that the preserved subjective element present in Adams
will survive the amended regulation. Given the language of the amendment to 50 C.F.R. §
20.21 (i)(2) and the stance provided in Adams, a good argument can be made to remove any
subjective element from the intent requirement under the MBTA. However, this Comment
asserts that a complete removal of this standard will subject hunters and farmers to criminal
sanctions not intended under the spirit of the statute. The goal of the MBTA is the preservation
of migratory birds, but imposing rigid standards on hunters and farmers by not allowing them
the right to prove that their practices were in common with the local standards does not advance
the goals articulated in the Act.83See Adams, 174 F.3d at 575-76.
84See supra note 79.
85Construing the MBTA as a strict liability statute part of the time and as allowing
subjective intent to be considered at other times clearly leaves the hunters and farmers affected
by the act in the dark because they are unclear as to what activities are allowed by the Act.
8The variation spoken of is the different application of the intent standards applied
in Adams and Boynton. In Adams, the court primarily sided with the objective standard, but
conscientiously carved out an exception to allow evidence to be presented by the accused to
prove that their actions conformed with local practices. Conversely, Boynton rejected any di
minimus use of the subjective standard articulated in Brandt, and relied solely on the objective
standard, which would effectively preclude any admission of evidence due to its strict liability
characteristics.
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placed on the MBTA, innocent hunters and farmers87 will be allowed
to present evidence of the community standards under which they
decided to plant their annual crops or hunt in their favorite place.
The debate over the objective and subjective intent
requirement, while complex, is clear on one point: both sides have
cognizable interests they are determined to protect. In the future, if
courts ignore the subjective element in Adams, then local standards
by which farmers and hunters act will not be the guide used to
determine if they sought to either illegally bait or kill migratory
birds.88
The importance of this is highlighted by considering the goal
of the MBTA - to protect migratory birds from becoming extinct
through illegal practices. If the courts use an impractical standard to
interpret the actions of hunters and farmers, then citizens will be
arbitrarily penalized for either the required activity of farming, or the
recreational right of hunting.89 In conclusion, it is important to take
the recent amendment of 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 (i)(2) in context with the
totality of discussions over which standard to use, and to follow the
court's decision in Adams by combining the objective and subjective
standards to determine the intent of the accused.
87But see supra note 52 (holding that the respective innocence of hunters and
farmers is irrelevant because the MBTA uses an objective intent requirement).
88See, e.g., Yandell v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Miss. 1982) (upholding
the conviction and not allowing extrinsic evidence of a defendant who was arrested over thirty-
seven hundred feet from an area supposedly baited for birds).
9While the necessity of hunting for survival has drastically decreased in the past
century, the privilege of hunting today is still a hotly debated topic. See Cottriel, supra note 4,
at 1238-42. However, with the increase in population in America and across the world, farming
has not been questioned as a fundamental necessity for our survival.
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